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SO.ME REMARKS UPON CHARGING THE JURY IN A
TRIAL FOR MURDER.*
Upon a trial for murder in Pennsylvania the prisoner may
be convicted of murder of the first degree, the penalty for which
is death, or murder of the second degree, with a maximum pun-
ishment of twenty yiars' imprisonment, or lanslaughter, with a
maximum penalty of twelve years' imprisonment. It is, there
fore, obviously important for the interests, both of the prisoner
and the Commonwealth, that the jury should have the law so
stated to them that they can easily apply it to the facts of the
case. A charge may- be correct in point of law and yet so com-
plicated as not to be intelligible to a jury. A judge might read
to the jury an approved textbook upon homicide, and yet this,
while a correct exposition of the law, wduld hardly be considered
an intelligent way to instruct a jury. So a judge may take the
charge of another judge .which has been held to be correct and
read it to the jury. The charge of Chief-Justice Agnew in the
* This paper was read before the Pennsylvania Bar Association on Wednes-
day. June" 28. icop. by the Honorable Robert Ralston. and is here reprint(d by
permission.
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case of Common'calth v. Drum' is published in the Supreme
Court Reports. This seems to be regarded as the model of what
a charge ought to be. It is an elaborate review of murder at
common law, first and second degree murder under the statute,
manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary, and the law of self-
defence. It is no doubt admirable, but there are few, if any,
cases where it is necessary to go into'such a wide range of sub-
jects. Yet the judges in Pennsylvania almost invariably deem
it essential in a trial for murde" to define the various degrees of
homicide and consider that they have done their duty when they
have given the definition in Chief-Justice Agnew's charge-some
of them going so far as to read long extracts from it. Such a
charge is no doubt a correct statement of the law and could not
be reversed by the Supreme Court: but the judge is not charging
for the Supreme Court; he is supposed to be telling the-jury
what the law is as applicable to the case in hand, so that they
can apply it to the facts and render a just verdict.
The chief trouble arises from attempting to define muider
and manslaughter. because there are no definitions of these crimes
which mean anything without further explanation.
In his evidence before the Homicide Law Amendment Com-
mittee (i874) Baron Bramwell said:
"If you had to look for a definition of murder, you would
not find it anywhere precisely laid down; you would have to search
through Coke's Institutes, Hale's Pleas of the Crown, Hawkins's
Pleas of the Crown. Leach's Crown Iaw, and Russell on Crimes,
and a score of other books. You would not find it intelligibly
or authoritatively stated anywhere to comprehend all cases; and
in addition to that, when you (lid find it, you would find it en-
cumbered with what I cannot help calling a number of unfor-
tunate expressions about malice. and malice aforethought, and
other things which are attended with several mischiefs."
In 1389 the Statute 13 Rich. II was passed forbidding the
granting of a pardon for murder with "malice prepense." Sub-
sequent statutes excluded from benefit of clergy "wilful prepense-
3 58 Pa. t.
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murders," "prepensed murder," 2 "murder upon malice pre-
pensi," 3 "wilful murder of malice prepensed." 4 "murder of
malice prepensed." " And so malice prepense or aforethought
came to be the essential criterion of murder, which is, therefore,
defined as the unlawful killing of another with -malice afore-
thought, and manslaughter as the unlawful killing of another
without malice aforethought. But what is malice aforethought?
That is the clue to the definition. When we know what that means
we know what murder is and not before. And to know what it
-means we must read the elaborate textlxxks upon homicide, and
the hundreds of reported cases in which certain facts have been
held to constitute murder and certain others manslaughter. The.
definition is, therefore, the equivalent of saying that murder is
a killing under such circumstances as the courts have adjudged
to be murder, or, in other words, murder is murder.
After defining murder malice must be explained, and our
judges usually do this by reading the following extract from
Chief-Justice Agnew's charge, which is in its turn a quotation
from Foster's Crown Law:
"'It is not malice in its ordinary understanding alone-a par-
ticular ill-will, a spite or grudge. Malice is a legal term. imply-
ing much more. It comprehends not only a particular ill-will.
but every case where there is wickedness of disposition, hardness
of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind re-
gardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be
intended to be injured." '
Every juror probably has the popular meaning of malice in
his mind and no further knowledge of its legal significance than
he has acquired from this statemenf. It is hardly to be supposed
that he could always readily determine what facts show such a
wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, or cruelty as to make
the crime murder.
2 12 Hen. VII, c. 7.
24 Hen. VIII, c. 2.
423 Hen. VII, c. I. secs. 3 and 4.
I Edw. VI, c. 12. sec. io; Stcphcn's liist. Crim. Law of England, vol. 3,
pp. 42-44.
* Agnew, J.. in Com. v. Drum. $8 Pa. iS.
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I shall give a few instances by way of illustration:
A, for a very trifling slight, evinces a deadly hatred against
B and states that he proposes to shoot him at the earliest oppor-
tunity. He neets him in the street, fires upon him and kills him,
and afterwards says he is glad he did it. This, undoubtedly,
would be murder, and would evince a wicked, depraved, and
malignant spirit, within the definition of malice. Vary the cir-
cumstances a little: A makes the same threat, but upon meeting
13 in the street says that he had intended to kill him, but has left
his revolver behind, that if he had it with him he would kill him.
He thereupon slaps B in the face with his open hand; B falls, and,
striking his head on the pavement, is killed; when A is informed
of his death, he says that he is glad, that he would have shot
him if he had had his weapon with him. Does not. A evince the
same wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit in the latter case
as in the former, md if that be nmlice, is not A guilty of mur-
der? But he is not, he is guilty merely of involuntary man-
slaughter.
A family in Canada were in the most destiiute circum-
stances; the children were actually starving. The father, in order
to save one of them from what he considered an inevitable and
painful death, took the child to a bridge and dropped it into the
river.
In a recent case in Philadelphia, under similar circumstances,
a man, for the purpose of seeking food, left his wife and two
children in a bare attic room, starving and without hope of relief.
When he returncd he found the door locked; upon its being
broken open the mother and two children were discovered
asphyxiated by gas. The woman and one child recovered, but
the other died.
Would a jury be apt to conclude that this man and this
woman had acted with malice, when they dearly loved their chil-
dren and killed them for what they believed to be their own good?
And yet in both cases the crime was murder.
[ may also incntion two English cases:
The pris, mncr ohahited w ith the dcceased for several months
previ'us to her death, and !.he was with child by him. They
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were in a state of extreme distre.s, being unable to pay for their
lodging, which they quit on the evening of the night on which the
deceased was drowned, and had no place of shelter. They passed
the evening together at the theatre and. a fterwards went to West-
minster Bridge to drown themselves in the Thames. .they got
into a boat and from that into another boat. The water where
the first boat which they entered was moo red -was not of sufficient
depth to drown them. They talked for some time in the boat in
which they at last got, he standing with his foot on the edge of
the boat and she leaning on him. The prisoner then found him-
-self in the water, but whether by actual throwing himself or by
accident did not appear. He struggled and got back into the
boat and then found that Eliza Anthony was gone. He en-
deavored to save her, but he could not get her and she was
drowned.
Mr. Justice Best told the jury that if both went to the water
for the purpose of drowning themselves together, each encour-
aged the other in the commission of a felonious act and the sur-
vivor was guilty -of murder.
The prisoner was convicted and afterwards recommended
for a pardon.7
The prisoner and deceased, who passed as man and wife,
engaged the back parlor of a house in Great Leonard Street,
Shoreditch, for which they were to pay 3s. 6d. a week, the fur-
niture being the landlord's. When they went there they had noth-
ing to eat but a piece of bread and butter. They had not a
change of clothes and those they had were not sufficient to cover
them, and while they were there they pledged the furniture to
obtain the means of subsistence. The woman was discovered
lying dead on the bed. The prisoner said that they had both
agreed to take poison. He was in very great distress and starv-
ing. He said. "We wished to die in each other's arms and laid
down on the bed directly and we both drank it together." The
judge instructed the jury that this was murder.$
You, gentlemen of the bar, may have no difficulty in saying
,Rex. v. Dyson. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 523.
*Regina v. Allison, 8 Car. and P. 4 A
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at once that all these prisoners were guilty of murder, but would
a jury with no other knowledge upon the subject than the defini-
tion of malice as given to them, and their own popular sense of
the word, not shrink from attributing hardness of heart, wicked-
ness of disposition. and cruelty to any one of the poor unfor-
tunates in the cases which I have cited?
To appreciate what malice means it is necessary to study. the
authorities. Let us examine some of these and see if it is not
possible to arrive at an exact understanding of the term.
Lord Coke's treatment of the subject is characteristically
disorderly, ill-arranged, and illogical. He says: "Malice prepense
is when one compaj,'cthi to kill, wound, or beat another and doeth
it sedato animo." ' That is express malice-a premeditated kill-
ing. If lie had said that it was an intentional killing, wounding,
or beating, lie would have struck the key-note, and much con-
fusion would have been avoided. WVhere a man kills another
suddenly without any apparent motive it is murder. The law
regards the intention with which an act is done and not the
motive, although motive -may be and often is a very important
circumstance. This difficulty was felt by Coke, for he goes on
to say that malice is implied in three cases:
"i. In respect of the maimer of the deed, as if one kills
another without any provocation on the part of him that is slain,
the law implieth malice. Also the poisoning of any man implieth
malice." One cannot murder another by poison without com-
passing to kill him scdato animio, and the killing of another with-
out provocation would be a compassing-attaining, accomplish-
ing, going about, taking a step towirds-his death.
"2. In respect of the person slain, as if a magistrate or
known officer, that bath lawful warrant, in doing or offering to
do his office or to execute his warr.ant is slain, this is malice im-
plied by the law."
-3- In respect of the person killing, as if A assault B to
rob him and kills him, this is murder by implied malice, albeit
lie never saw or knew him before." He then states the monstrous
doctrine that a killing in the doing of any unlawful act is murder.
9
'CokeI's Institute. pp. 51, 52. 56, 57.
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To sum this up it is murder:
To kill another with premeditation.
To kill another without provocation.
To kill another by poison.
To kill a known officer while performing his duty.
To kill a man in an attempt to rob him.
To kill in the performance of any unlawful act.
Hale follows Coke. He divides malice into two kinds,
malice in fact and malice in law. Malice in fact is a deliberate
intention of doing some corporal harm to the person of another,
and is evidenced by lying in wait, menacings antecedent, former
grudges, deliberate compassing, and the like. Malice in law is
to kill without provocation, to kill an officer, td kill in an attempt
to rob. Having got so far as to say that malice in fact is a
deliberate intention to do corporal harm, it is hard to see why
he puts killing without provocation under the head of implied
malice.10
In the case of Rcgiza v. Mowgridgc 11 Lord Holt said:
"Malice is a design formed of doing mischief to another,
. he that doth a cruel act voluntarily doth it of malice pre-
pensed. . . . Therefore when a man shall without any provo-
cation stab another with a dagger or knock out his brains with a
bottle, this is express malice, for he designingly and purposely
did him the mischief."
This is rational and easily understood. If one does an act
with an intention to kill or do great bodily harm, or which is
likely to have that effect, he does it with malice, or, in other words,
such an act is murder.
Foster says:
"When the law maketh use of the term 'malice afore-
thought,' as descriptive of the crime of murder, it is not to be
understood in that narr6w, restrained sense to which the modem
use of the word 'malice' is apt to lead one-a principle of malev-)
U Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 451.
Kelyng, x27, 1707.
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olence to particulars--for the law by the term 'malice' in this
instance meaneth that the fact hath been attended with such cir-
cumstances as are the ordinary symptoms of a wicked, depraved.
malignant spirit. ... and carry in them plain indications of a
heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief." 12
Finally Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, after an examination
of all the authorities, reduces the meaning of malice to one or
more of the following states of mind:
"i. An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily
harm to, any person. whether such person is the person actually
killed or not.
"2. Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably
cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, somd person,
whether such person is the person actually killed or not, although
such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or
grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may
not be caused.
"3. An intent to commit any. felony whatever.
"'4. An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on
his way to. in, or returning from the execution of the duty
of arresting. keeping in custody, or imprisoning any person whom
he is lawfully entitled to arrest, keep in custody, or imprison, or
the duty of keeping the peace or dispersing an unlawful assembly,
provided that the offender has notice that the person killed is such
an officer so employed.'
' 3
Having learned the meaning of malice, it is easy to say what
r.,urder is. To give some illustrations of Stephen's analysis.
i. If there 'was an intention to kill or do great bodily harm
to another, it is murder. The intention must be gathered from
the circumstances of each case.
A strikes B on the head with an axe, stabs him in the heart
with a knife, or shoots him in a vital spot; his act shows an intent
to kill and it is murder (of the first degree under our statute).
A beats B with a moderate-sized stick, or brutally and re-
' Foster's Crown Law. 256-257.
"Stephen Dig. Crim. Law (Ed. 29o4). 18.
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peatedly kicks him; this shows an intention to do great bodily
harm and is murder (of the second degree under our statute,
unless the circumstances warrant the jury in finding an intention
to kill).
A, not knowing that B lias heart disease, strikes him with
a light stick; this does not show an intention to kill or do great
bodily harm. and is manslaughter. If it were proven that A
knew B's condition and that his act would kill him, and that he
intended to kill him, it would be murder.
A slaps B in the face, B falls and is killed by striking his
head; this does not show an intention to kill or hurt, and is
manslaughter (involuntary under our statutes).
A shoots at B. intending to kill him, and kills C; it. is murder.
If it be borne in mind that the intention to kill or do great
bodily harm is the criterion of murder, the cases mentioned in the
first part of this paper are easily understood.
2. If there is knowledge that the act will probably cause
death or grievous bodily harm. it is murder, whether death or
harm was intended or not.
A. in order to rescue a prisoner, explodes a barrel of powder
in a crowded street against the prison wall and kills several per-
sons; this is murder.
A throws a heavy timber from the top of a house into a
crowded street; it is murder.
A woman delivers herself of a child and leaves it in the
road exposed to the cold; this would be murder or manslaughter.
depending upon whether or not she knew that it would probably
die.
3. It is murder to kill another in the commission of a felony,
whether death was intended or riot.
A, intending to rape B. seizes her and throws a shawl over
her head to prevent her outcries, and B is smothered: it is murder.
although it is evident that he did not intend to kill her.
A, attempting to commit burglary. enters B's house. 13 seizes
him, and .\. in ,,rder to escape, throws him to the ground and
death results; this is murder, although there was no intention to
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kill or do great bodily harm, nor was such the probable conse-
quence of the act.
4. It is murder to kill an officer of justice in the lawful exe-
cution of his duty, without regard to the intention.
A, a police officer, lawfully arrests' B; B. attempting to
escape, strikes him with his fist. A strikes his head and is killed;
this is murder. So if C, in endeavoring to rescue B. kills the
officer, it is murder.
The Pennsylvania Statute of April 22, 1794,4 provides
that:
..All murder which shall be perpetrated by-means of poison
Or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate,
anti premeditated killing. or which shall be conunitted in the per-
petration of or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree, and all
other murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree."
If there is an intention to kill, deliberately formed and
executed, it is murder of the first degree. If this be understood,
it may be easily applied to the" illustrations already given. If
the murder is done in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate
any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery, it is murder of the first
degree, whether there was an intention to kill or not.
Usually the issue in a murder trial may be reduced to one or
two simple propositions. In a trial for poisoning, days and weeks
may be consumed in hearing medical and other tegtimony, and
vet the question will eventually be, Did the deceased die of poison
administered by the prisoner? A man shoots another; the ques-
tion will be. did he intend to kill him: it is evident that he did.
The defence is that he did it in self-defence; or that he did it in
the heat of passion, upon sufficient provocation. So that the
Commonwealth contends for a state of facts which constitutes a
crime of a certain grade, and the defence endeavors to establish
another state of facts which reduces the grade of the crime or
justifies an acquittal. In charging the jury is it better'for the
judge to tell them that if they find so and so to be the facts, the
"3 Sm. L z87.
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prisoner is guilty of such a crime, while if they believe the /acts
to be as maintained by the prisoner. he is guilty of such another
crime or not guilty, as the case may be; or, to enter into a long
dissertation upon homicide, defining murder at common law, ex-
plaining the meaning of malice, and many other things in no way
applicable to the facts of the case?
In his examination before the Homici de Law Amendment
Committee, upon being asked if he did not think the definitions
in the act were confusing, Baron Bramwell said:
"I ihink a judge who knows his. business never troubles
the jury with needless definitions, but he deals with the particular
case before him, and says, for instance, in the case which I have
put: The first question that you have to consider is' (forgive a
sort of model summing up) 'did the man die of the injuries which
he received? The doctors prove lie did. The next question is,
did the prisoner commit them? as to which the evidence is so and
so. Now you have to consider, if you are of opinion that he is, at
least, guilty of having killed him, whether it is murder; and that
depends upon the extent of the blows and the place they were
directed to. If you think he intended to kill him, and did, it
matters not what means lie used; but suppose lie did not intend
it. yon must consider whether the means used were likely to do it.'
If you observe, in that case you lay down no definition; you
assume that the jury and you both know what the law is; or you
tell them what the law is in that particular case. I frankly con-
fess that if I had to give the jury a definition, 'First of all, gen-
tlemen, I have to tell you what homicide is, and then what criminal
homicide is, and then what is not criminal homicide,* I expect the
jury would be utterly bewildered. It is my duty, as a judge, to
inform myself of the meaning of the act, and not to trouble the
jury with a definition, except so far as necessary."
In order that you may contrast the two methods of charging
a jury I will give you a few examples:
The deceased and the prisoner got into an argument on the
street over some dice. The deceased approached the prisoner
and offered to fight him, but made no attempt to draw any
weapon, nor (lid lie have one in his possession. They moved up
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the street. the prisoner retreating and the deceased walking after
him. still engaged in a wordy war. buit no physical collision
occurred. Finally, the deceased said, "If you think you are a bet-
ter man than I am, pull off your coat and fight it o'it," at the
same time starting to take off his coat and still advancing towards
the prisoner. The prisoner immediately drew a revolver and fired
two shots at the deceased, killing him almost instantly. No testi-
mony was offered by the defence.
In his charge to the jury the judge defines murder, explains
malice in the words of Chief-Justice Agnew; then informs them
that murder is of two degrees, reads the statute, and accuratey
states that in murder of the first degree there is a specific intent
to take life: that when the killing is committed in the perpetra-
tion of the enumerated felonies the law implies an intent to take
life (which is a pure fiction, as the intent is immaterial). -
This much of the charge covers a large page and a half of
typewriting.
He then tells them that a verdict of manslaughter is possible,
and defines it in the usual way as a killing without malice express
or implied. He then explains the difference between voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter, telling them that they have no
right to convict of involuntary manslaughter, as that is not a
felony, so that if they believe he committed involuntary man-
slaughter they should acquit him.
This covers another page and a half.
He then takes up the subject of justifiable homicide, as when
the sheriff hangs in pursuance of the judgment of the court; then
self-defence with illustrations.
Two pages more.
He then comes back to voluntary manslaughter and explains
provocation.
The charge covers six large, closely typewritten pages and
is entirely upon the law, the evidence not being reviewed.
The jury rendered a verdict of vluntary manslaughter.
It will be observed that there was no evidence whatever which
could by any possibility reduce the crime to voluntary man-
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slaughter; and how a shooting under such circumstances could be
involuntary manslaughter is inconceivable. Nor was there any
evidence at all that it was done in self-defence. The crime was
nurder. and if the plea had been guilty, the judge under the evi-
dence would have been obliged to fix the grade as first degree.
This charge is correct in Ixint of law, but is it not likely that the
jury failed to clearly grasp the distinctions Lic-tween the various
crimes and that their minds were confused by the definitions of
murder and manslaughter. and that they did not appreciate the
fact that malice in this case meant simply an intention to kill or
do great bodily harm?
1 cite this chargt not as exceptional, but, on the contrary, as
a type of what may be called the conventional charge in a murder
trial. I could mention dozens of similar ones. Some judges, as I
said before, simply read Chief-Justice Agnew's charge in the
Drum case.
In another case the deceased and the prisoner got into a dis-
pute over a game of cards. One of them, whether the prisoner
or the deceased was in doubt. said "Come outside and we %ill
fight." whereupon the deceased arose and left the room; the pris-
oner followed him, dratwing a revolver from his pocket. Almost
immediately after he had got out of the room a shot was heard.
The prisoner's story was that the deceased came at him with a
razor and that he fired in self-defence.
After reviewing the testimony the judge charged the jury
that. as the shooting was admitted, the prisoner was guilty of
murder unless he did it in self-defence. He then told them that
there were two degrees of murder, and that it was their duty to
fix the degree.
"xurder of the first degree is the wilful, deliberatc, and pre-
meditated killing of another. In this case how are you to deter-
mine whether it was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated. You
iliust conider the prisoner's actio ns, anl also the weapon which
he used and the place upton the lxidy of the deceased wherq he
tired the weapon. Wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
mean.s that the prisoner formed an intention to kill and for the
lurl i e ,f carrying iot that intention did the act which caused the
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death. If he formed an intention to kill, the murder is wilful,
deliberate, and premeditated. It takes but a short time, as you
know, to form an intention, and if a man has time to form an
intention to kill and carries that out, it is murder of the first
degree. I f he did not form an intention to kill, it would be murder
of the second degree."
The .law of self-defence was explained.
No definitions were given, nor was the word malice used. No.
part of the law was referred to except such as 'as applicable
to the facts of the case.24"
The prisoner was convicted of murder of the first digree.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and the charge at-
tacked as not containing any definition of murder or any definition
of manslaughter or any use of or definition of the word "malice."
The judgment. however, was affirmed.16
In a trial for nmurder by poisoning the court defined common
law murder. gave the full language of the statute, stated that
the element of malice must be present, and gave the definition of
malice which is found in Commonwacalth v. Drum.
In another case the court charged:
**If the defendant murdered his wife by means of poison, it
would be murder in the first degree, and the jury needs neither
definition nor instruction in regard to any other kind of homicide.
If you find that the defendant sent the poison to his wife with the
intent to take her life, then the law says that is murder in the first
degree, and you should say so in your verdict." t-
If the evidence in the case should warrant a verdict of man-
slaughter, the crime need not be defined, but the judge may tell the
jury that a killing in the heat of passion, aroused upon sufficient
provocation, explaining what that is, will reduce an intentional
killing, which would otherwise be murder, to manslaughter.
The object of this paper has been to show that the definition
of murder is meaningless in itself; that malice is a technical term
The charge is published in 14 District Reports, 663.
Coninzonwalth v. Gibson. 211 Pa. 546.
'.tfr.een v. C6v,.unOnwealth. 114 Pa. 3oM.
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which means that a killing under certain circumstances is murder,
and that what these circumstances are cannot be known without
a study of the authorities; anti it is only after such a study that
we are enabled to attain a definite and clear understanding of the
term. That it is possible to so instruct a jury in a murder trial
that they can have no difficulty in applying the law to the facts.
I have given you the examples of two methods of charging a jury,
both of which have been sustained by the Supreme Court. I leave
it to you to decide which is the better of the two. -
